The flooding of the Yser plain by Demerre, G. & Termote, J.
The flooding 
ofthe Yser plain
Guido Demerre & Johan Termote
Nieuwpoort viewed from the east. Aeria l photograph made by a German scout on 19 August 
1917. (Bundesarchiv, Koblenzj
1 Sluice at Nieuwendamme creek through which the inundation o f Nieuwendamme polder took 
place in the night o f 21 to 22 October 1914
2 Oude Veurnesas sluice, through which the first inundation attempt was made in the night o f 26  
to 2 7  October 1914
3 Spillway o f the Noordvaart canal, through which the flooding was carried out on 29  October 
1914
The northwesternmost part of Belgium 
played an important part in the First World 
War, as it was there, on the plains of the 
river Yser, that the advance of the German 
Fourth Army came to a halt. This was thanks 
to a tried and tested method: flooding 
or inundation. The flat Flemish polders, 
situated below sea level at high tide, were 
ideally suited for such a scheme. It was 
sufficient to manipulate the Ganzepoot 
sluice complex at Nieuwpoort, which 
controlled the inflow of seawater and the 
drainage ofthe polders in the hinterland.
In those dramatic days of October 1914 
the flooding of the Yser valley did not go 
smoothly at all, however. But after the war, 
these early setbacks were soon forgotten 
and the actual events were embellished. This 
inspired many romanticised patriotic stories, 
reinforced by all sorts of vanity documents 
written by those involved. What follows is an 
as objective as possible representation of 
the facts.
Water as a means of defence
Inundation is a means of defence that has 
been used frequently in the Low Countries 
at least since the end of the 16th century.
It has primarily been used to defend ports, 
as was the case during the Siege of Ostend 
(1600-1604). The city of Nieuwpoort has also 
regularly adopted these tactics throughout 
history. The floodgates around the city were 
opened several times to flood the area dur­
ing the French-Spanish wars in the second 
half ofthe 17th century. The last flooding 
took place in 1813-1814 when French troops 
defended the city. So the military command­
ers were sufficiently familiar with flooding 
as a means to halt the German advance at 
the onset of the First World War. The British 
and French high command were also aware 
ofthe possibilities. British engineers had 
helped to fortify the city of Nieuwpoort w ith­
in the scope ofthe completion ofthe Wel­
lington Barrier between 1815 and 1830. This 
fortification was equipped with a system of 
floodgates. In addition, French military engi­
neer Vauban had drawn up detailed inunda­
tion plans for the port of Dunkirk in 1694.
The floodgates of this fortification were 
still operational at the outbreak of the First
World War, which was no longer the case for 
Nieuwpoort. With the exception ofthe sluice 
at Nieuwendamme creek, the fortifications 
around the city had been systematically de­
molished from 1853 onwards.
Of great importance was the fact that the 
drainage system ofthe Yser basin had been 
completely altered between 1861 and 1880, 
so shortly before the First World War. This 
large-scale project was aimed at improving 
drainage as well as navigation. The Lovaart 
canal was widened, deepened and em­
banked, a sluice gate and spillway were con­
structed at the confluence of this canal with 
the Yser river near the hamlet of Fintele, and 
siphons were constructed under the Lovaart 
canal for drainage (see map). The project was 
completed with the construction of several 
sluices and spillways at Nieuwpoort. The 
Veurnesas sluice on the new Veurnevaart 
canal as well as the sluices and spillways on 
the Noordvaart canal (1875) and the leper- 
vaart canal (or the canalised Yser river) were
given a makeover. Flowever, this system was 
not perfect: priority had been given to navi­
gation instead of drainage. Nevertheless, the 
system was flexible enough to allow the navi­
gable waterways to be used for drainage in 
case of abundant rainfall. All these hydraulic 
works were to play a crucial part in the war 
and helped facilitate the continued flooding 
ofthe Yser valley.
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1. Oude Veurnesas sluice
2. Spillway of Nieuw Bedelf
3. Sluice on the Plassendale-Nieuwpoort canal
4. Sluice on the Nieuwendamme creek
5. Spillway and lepersas sluice on the Yser
6. Spillway on the Noordvaart canal
7. Veurnesas sluice and spillway on the Veurnevaart canal
8. Siphon under the Yser
9. Siphon under the Veurnevaart canal
Kool hofvaart embankment. 1914
Dam on the Veurnevaart canai. 1916
12. Dam on the Oostvaart canal
Sas van Dierendonck or sluice of the Oostvaart canal
Inundations Culvert or siphon
Railway Sluice or spillway
German line
■ :  ; G rote Bam b u rg f  a rm
Raised dam
Overview o f the different inundations (VLIZ, Nathalie De Hauwere) 
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—1  Diksmuide -  Nieuwpoort railway
• Edge ofthe polder area
1. Flooding planned by the British (10 October 1914) between 
the Plassendale-Nieuwpoort canal and the dunes
2. Flooding of Nieuwendammepolder on 21-22 October 1914
3. Flooding of the Dunkirk area by the French on 25 October 1914
4. Flooding planned by the Belgians on 27 October 1914
5. Flooding on 28 October 1914
6. Flooding of the Handzame valley on 15 November 1914
7. Flooding of Bamburgpolder on 16 November 1914
8. Flooding in early 1915
9. Flooding of the Yser valley in the spring of 1918
Why was flooding resorted to in 
extremis?
The question of who came up with the 
idea of flooding is not very relevant. Yet it 
still is the subject of numerous discussions.
A much more intriguing question is why this 
means of defence was only used in the final 
stage ofthe Battle ofthe Yser and not earlier. 
The Battle of the Yser started on 15 October 
when the port of Ostend fell into German 
hands and the Belgian high command 
decided to defend the natural boundary 
formed by the river Yser at any cost. The 
French high command sent reinforcements: 
French fusiliers marins defended the 
bridgehead of Diksmuide. The German army 
mounted a massive attack on 18 October.
With the help of French troops, the battered 
Belgian army held out at the expense of 
heavy losses. Because they had waited for 
so long, the opportunities for flooding had 
declined considerably by now.
The fact that the decision was taken 
so late raises questions. British officers 
-  probably including Colonel Tom Bridges -  
had already contacted sluice keeper Gerard 
Dingens at the Nieuwpoort sluice complex 
on 10 October. They asked him to flood the 
area between the Nieuwpoort-Plassendale 
canal and the coastal dunes with a view to 
the defence of Ostend. The sluice keeper, 
however, was clearly more concerned about 
the human and economic impact ofthe 
flooding and pointed out the inefficiency 
of such an operation. When on 13 October 
Commandant Prudent Nuyten asked him to 
draw up an inundation plan, Mr Dingens was 
conspicuously reluctant. In theory it was still 
fairly easy to flood both banks of the Yser at 
that moment, which would have prevented 
or at least shortened the bloody Battle ofthe 
Yser. There was still another reason why this 
did not happen.
On 11 October the Belgian and French 
forces had opted for a coordinated command. 
This implied that the commanders, King 
Albert of Belgium and French General Paul 
François Grossetti (commander ofthe 42nd 
division), communicated directly with 
General Ferdinand Foch, who had been 
in command ofthe northern army group 
since September 1914. So it was Foch who 
was responsible for the joint war effort in 
consultation with the British Expeditionary 
Force and the Belgian army. Up to 1911, the 
63-year-old Foch had been a commander 
and teacher at the École Supérieure de 
Guerre (a military academy), where he 
had developed doctrines about the all-out 
offensive (offensive à l ’ outrance) in several 
authoritative publications. These doctrines 
characterised his approach in the first 
months of the war. According to this vision, 
the possibilities for a counteroffensive had to 
be left open at all times. This is what stood in 
the way of a complete inundation o fthe Yser 
valley. Only after the failed counterattacks by 
the French 42nd Division at the Yser front on 
21 and 23 October did General Foch realise
that a more defensive strategy was the only 
way to stop the German advance. Only then 
were the Belgian inundation plans taken into 
consideration. Furthermore, an inundation 
on Belgian soil was of vital importance to 
France for the defence ofthe Channel ports 
of Dunkirk, Gravelines and Calais. Even if 
they were protected by a flooding on French 
soil, the French ports would still be within 
the range ofthe German artillery, which 
would result in their gradual destruction. An 
inundation on Belgian soil would create an 
additional buffer and could safeguard the 
French ports against such a catastrophe. 
Nieuwpoort would not be so lucky.
Heroes just for one day
Bargee Hendrik Geeraert
On 17 October the Belgian troops had 
taken control ofthe sluices, but there was 
a breakdown in communication with the 
sluice operators, and in particular sluice 
keeper Gerard Dingens, who was disregarded 
and sent away. As a result, the sluice 
operators joined the stream of refugees 
without keeping in touch with the military 
commanders. The failure to requisition the 
sluice operators turned out to be a huge 
mistake later on. Fortunately, an attentive 
bargee called Hendrik Geeraert (1863- 
1925) stayed on the scene and advised and 
assisted the Belgian troops. His practical 
mentality and attentiveness made him 
the perfect substitute for the discharged 
sluice operators. Fie would be part o fthe 
special engineer company that managed the 
hydraulic structures throughout the war.
The first limited inundation
In the brief window of opportunity 
allowed by the French offensive strategy, the
General Ferdinand Foch (1851-1929} d id  not 
give his consent to an inundation on Belgian 
soil until 24 October (W ikipedia}
Belgian engineers carried out a first limited 
flooding at Nieuwendampolder (just east of 
Nieuwpoort) in the night of 21 to 22 October. 
This flooding was not very difficult to achieve 
from a technical perspective, as the sluice on 
the Nieuwendamme creek, which also served 
as a floodgate, could be used. This is where 
Hendrik Geeraert made his first appearance. 
Thanks to his knowledge ofthe terrain, a 
limited area could be flooded with seawater. 
This prevented the Germans from encircling 
Nieuwpoort and protected the sluice complex 
in particular. Mr Geeraert proved his worth 
by pointing out that the siphon under the 
canalised Yser had to be closed off if the 
inundation was to be successful. So the 
siphon was closed off.
Fiendrik Geeraert posing in front the spillway o f the Noordvaart canal 
(Callanaere-Dehouc Collection}
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A complete inundation
with the help o f Karel Cogge
The necessity of a complete inundation 
became clear a few days later. The German 
advance proved to be unstoppable. Two 
German battalions were already on the left 
bank ofthe Yser on 24 October. Sunday 
25 October was a crucial day. What was 
left ofthe Belgian army retreated behind 
the embankment of the railway between 
Nieuwpoort and Diksmuide in the morning.
In an attempt to gain an insight into the 
hydrology, the potential consequences of 
the flooding initiated by the French and the 
practical execution of a complete inundation 
of part of the Yser plain, the Belgian 
Fleadquarters (established in Veurne) tried 
to contact specialists. But the engineers of 
Noordwatering Polder turned out to have fled 
the town. Eventually, Captain-commandant 
Prudent Nuyten enlisted the help of Karel 
Cogge (1855-1922) at the advice of mayor 
Raphael De Spot and justice ofthe peace 
Feys. Mr Cogge was a supervisor at a 
public body in charge of protection against 
flooding, was very familiar with the area’s 
hydrology and was able to answer Captain- 
commandant Nuyten’s specific questions. 
Contrary to many other members ofthe 
staff, Captain-commandant Nuyten was 
also able to communicate with Mr Cogge 
as he spoke the West Flemish dialect. On 
the basis of this information, a concrete 
plan was eventually drawn up which started 
from the new Belgian line of defence at that 
moment: the embankment ofthe railway 
between Nieuwpoort and Diksmuide. Time 
was running out: the French high command 
had already initiated its own inundation 
plan of flooding the area ofthe Colme river
Karel Cogge (Kristof Jacobs, Nieuwpoort 
Sector 1917j
A t the first attempt, the Oude Veurnesas sluice was opened so that the water could flow under 
the Nieuwpoort-Veurne canal via the Oude Veurnevaart canal (Veurne-spreekt.bej
The sluice gates o f the Noordvaart canal, which were opened at the second attempt 
(Kristof Jacobs, Nieuwpoort Sector 1917J
and Les Moëres by means of the sluices of 
Dunkirk. In practice, this meant that what 
was left o fthe Belgian forces could only 
retreat via a few corridors and would be 
trapped in case of a German breakthrough. 
By force of circumstances, the decision was 
made to flood the Yser plain as quickly and 
as completely as possible.
Easier said than done:
a two-stage operation
The practical implementation of this 
operation turned out to be problematic, 
however. As stated above, Nieuwpoort no 
longer had the required floodgates, the 
sluice operators were scattered and the 
city had come under German fire. At the 
request of Captain-Commander Nuyten,
Mr Cogge had suggested the possibility of 
inundating the area between the railway 
embankment and the left bank of the Yser 
in a controlled manner. This required using 
the spillway of the Noordvaart canal as 
well as closing the openings in the railway 
embankment at the locations where three 
fairly wide watercourses and about twenty 
small ditches passed under it. Initially, 
Captain-Commander Nuyten rejected this
plan because the sluices were no longer 
under Belgian control. Subsequently, Mr 
Cogge proposed an alternative which made 
use ofthe Oude Veurnesas sluice, located 
on the slightly safer west side of the city, 
for the inundation. Mr Cogge indicated the 
openings in the embankment that had to 
be closed. At high tide, seawater would be 
let in through the Oude Veurnesluis sluice 
and the Oude Veurnevaart canal and then 
forced under the Nieuwpoort-Veurne canal 
via the Arkevaart siphon. Beyond the siphon 
to the Koolhofvaart canal, a 150 m long bank 
across the Koofhofstuw weir was needed to 
prevent the floodwaters from entering the 
Belgian lines. The go-ahead was finally given 
after the military engineers had completed 
these preparations within 24 hours and the 
officers had taken Mr Cogge on an inspection 
twice. The first attempt made by Mr Cogge 
and Captain Thys in the night of 26 to 27 
October and on the next day failed due to 
technical reasons. Since they lacked the 
required tools, they could not secure the 
floodgates, which slammed shut again when 
the tide rose. They did succeed the following 
night and duringthe subsequent high tides. 
Flowever, the capacity turned out to be
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limited and the considerable detour and the 
siphon under the Veurne-Nieuwpoort canal 
furthermore proved to be an obstacle. In 
addition, it was neap tide so that the water 
supply remained limited. On the other hand, 
the rainy weather was a lucky break as the 
unmanned sluices remained closed, so that 
the inland water rose steadily as well.
In view of the precarious situation on 
the front and the panic at the Belgian 
headquarters in Veurne, the army eventually 
gave the order to open the spillways of 
the Noordvaart canal. In the night of 29 to 
30 October, Captain Fernand Umé and a 
detachment of soldiers raised the sluice 
gates of the Noordvaart canal following the 
directions of Hendrik Geeraert. This attempt 
was made within sight of the enemy, who 
remained remarkably passive and apparently 
was unaware of any harm. The gates were 
closed at low tide, mostly at night. Time 
was running out: German troops had in the 
meantime reached Ramskapelle and Pervijze, 
i.e. beyond the principal line of resistance 
formed by the railway embankment. ‘ La 
France sauvée par une rampe d ’ un mètre 
cinquante ’ (France saved by a 1.5 metre 
embankment), General Foch would write in 
his memoirs later on.
A 1.5 metre 
embankment
For two days, additional Belgian troops 
supported by the French waged a fierce 
battle for Ramskapelle and Pervijze. After the 
second flooding by Captain Umé and his 
men, the water in the fields already stretched 
southward to the village of Stuivekenskerke. 
This flooding combined with a counterattack
eventually forced the Germans to retreat 
from Ramskapelle and Pervijze in the 
afternoon of 31 October. When the Germans 
captured the bridgehead of Diksmuide after 
the Battle of the Yser on 10 November,
Captain Umé succeeded in bringing about a 
new inundation to the northeast of this city, 
in Flandzame valley. To do so, he opened the 
gates of the lepersas sluice on the Yser in 
Nieuwpoort on 15 November and the five 
following days, as a result of which 
Flandzame valley was flooded with seawater. 
The Allies took advantage of the fact that the 
right embankment of the Yser was low and 
the adjacent land served as tide storage in 
winter. The French had abandoned the 
bridgehead ofthe Redan (also known as 
Palingbrug) on 26 October, which had made 
the sluice complex vulnerable. Fortunately, 
they were able to retake their positions on 2 
November. A company under the command of 
Captain Thys then flooded the Boterdijk area 
up to Bamburghoeve farm op 16 November. 
They were assisted by the French fusiliers 
marins as their Captain Pelle des Forges had 
discovered a possibility to inundate the 
polder area of Lombardsijde in front ofthe 
bridgehead that same week. This stabilised 
the frontline. Nieuwpoort was even 
surrounded by water on two sides.
Flowever, this had come at a heavy cost of 
3,500 Belgian dead and 12,000 wounded. If 
flooding had been used at an earlier stage, 
this would have prevented a great deal of 
casualties.
Holding the line...
The inundation posed two important 
problems for the next four years: on the one
hand, the flooding had to be maintained and 
controlled further. On the other, the drainage 
ofthe area behind the railway embankment 
had to be completely revised.
Maintaining the flooding
It was far from easy to control the various 
inundations. The sluice complex was under 
German fire and the Allies feared the 
Germans would try to neutralise the 
inundation of the right bank by means of the 
drainage sluices in Ostend. The military 
engineers were primarily responsible for 
controlling the floodings. Already at the start 
ofthe Battle ofthe Yser, the Service des 
Inondations (Inundation Service) was 
established by order of Major Maglinse and 
Captain-commandant Nuyten. It was under 
the command of Captain-commandant 
Jamotte, who first recruited Captain Thys and 
later on Captain Umé for the execution. The 
Service des Inondations would be succeeded 
by a real unit, the Compagnie des Sapeurs- 
Pontonniers under the command of Captain 
Robert Thys, on 2 September 1915.
The engineers had to find an outlet for the 
excess surface water from the Veurne- 
Ambacht area in December 1914. The first 
obvious solution was using the siphon to the 
Arkevaart canal and the Oude Veurnesluis 
sluice, but now “ in the opposite direction” .
For four years they managed to respond to 
the devastation caused by the German 
artillery. In the summer of 1915 the Germans 
started to target the infrastructure. The 
Veurnesluis sluice at De Ganzepoot was 
progressively damaged so that the 
Veurnevaart canal was completely drained in 
January 1916. A huge emergency dam had to 
be raised near Nieuwpoort, and the sluice of 
the Oostvaart canal proved to be very useful
An emergency dam on the Nieuwpoort-Dunkirk canal at the moment o f a bomb explosion (Kristof Jacobs, Nieuwpoort Sector 1917J 
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The long-range gun Langer M ax in Moere could shell Dunkirk (Johan Termote)
for the drainage of rainwater from the 
unoccupied polder area. The flooding ofthe 
area between the railway embankment and 
the Yser was maintained through the Oude 
Veurnesas sluice. This was not the case for 
the marshes of Woumen, however. This is 
why the Yser was dammed up near Sint- 
Jacobskapelle in early 1915. The water used 
to inundate the Handzame valley was 
supplied by the upper reaches of the Yser 
from then on. In the process, the marshes of 
Noordschote, Reninge and Elzendamme were 
flooded as well. The aim was to raise the 
water level upstream from the Knokkebrug 
bridge as much as possible (up to + 4.3 m 
TAW [Second General Levelling]) so as to feed 
the flooding ofthe right bank ofthe Yser. 
Supplying water from the upper reaches of 
the Yser posed less of a problem in winter. In 
summer, however, water had to be pumped 
up from the Grote Beverdijkvaart canal. If 
fresh water was lacking, seawater could be 
supplied via the Nieuwpoort-Veurne canal 
and the Lovaart canal. Two pumps with a 
total capacity of over 100 m3 a minute had 
been installed at De Fintele for this purpose.
Revision ofthe drainage system
On the other hand, the drainage system of 
the Yser plain had to be entirely reorganised. 
Excess rainwater was pumped up from the 
Slopgatvaart canal and discharged through 
the Lovaart canal. This was also the case for 
the Steengracht ditch. Excess water from the 
upper reaches of the Yser near De Fintele had 
to be discharged through the Lovaart canal 
as well.
The work on the Lovaart canal carried out 




When the German spring offensive 
threatened the southern Belgian positions in 
1918, the area between Elzendamme (Oost- 
Vleteren) and the Belgian-French border was 
temporarily flooded as well. This flooding 
took place with fresh water and by means of 
weirs constructed across the Yser valley. This 
final flooding ofthe Westhoek area during 
WWI would help define the outcome of the 
Great War. Just like four years earlier, beating 
off the German attack on the Yser-leperlee 
line through inundation from Nieuwpoort 
played a decisive role in the further course 
of the First World War. This had considerably 
shortened the frontline on the North Sea 
coast and had largely stabilised it for 
four years. As a result, the pressure was 
concentrated on the Ypres Salient. The failure 
to take the Channel ports, the real objective 
ofthe western advance ofthe German Fourth 
Army in October 1914, was in part due to the 
inundations. The French harbours, vital for 
bringing in supplies from Britain, remained in 
Allied hands.
This did not prevent the Germans from 
continuing to set their sights on the port of 
Dunkirk all this time. They had several long- 
range guns that were capable of shelling this 
port. The Predikboom gun, mounted at the 
foot of Klerken hill, was put into operation on 
28 April 1915 and was finally silenced on 15 
May 1915. It was replaced by the notorious 
Leugenboom gun or Langer Max on 27 June 
1917. Despite intense shellings by the Allies, 
this 38 cm gun remained operational until 16 
October 1918. The 411 shells it fired on the 
port of Dunkirk and the 114 people killed as 
a result were not sufficient to take out the 
harbour. However, the psychological impact 
should not be underestimated.
Deployment of so few troops?
Finally, we wish to come back to those who 
implemented the inundation system for four 
years and the difficulties they encountered. 
This company consisted of 300 men at most. 
However, it took the Belgian high command 
nearly 9 months to provide sufficient troops. 
People like Captain Thys were often frustrated 
because the authorisations or orders came 
too late or were conflicting. They constantly 
had to improvise. Nevertheless, the 5 platoons 
and 3 sections of men from all ranks ofthe 
Belgian Army managed to make a valuable 
contribution to the war effort with the help 
of a few specialists, workhouses, rolling 
stock and supplied materials. A total of 27 
soldiers were killed in action. There were 
296 casualties of different chemical weapons 
employed by the Germans (especially from 
1917 onwards). This brings to mind a quote 
by Winston Churchill: “ Never in the field of 
human conflict was so much owed by so many 
to so few.”
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